Introduction
Collaborative partnerships -featuring intergovernmental and/or public-private sector cooperation -have been identified as a leading organisational expression of the 'new urban governance' (Davies, 2002: Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Stewart, 2005) .
Whether tasked with developing policy responses to complex social problems or restructuring service-delivery in order to meet demanding targets, these partnerships are one response to a widely recognised need for greater coordination in public administration. Following Kernaghan, a partnership may be defined as a formal agreement to share power with others in the pursuit of joint goals and/or benefits (2003, page 61) . The numerous types of partnerships may be distinguished by the nature and extent of control of influence exercised by the parties to the agreement. At the more ambitious end of joint working, collaborative partnerships are those in which each partner exercises power in the decision-making process: typically, they feature a pooling of resources, consensual decision rules and a harmonisation of activities (Kernaghan, 2003, page 62 ).
While area-based partnerships directed towards urban regeneration goals have received sustained academic attention, there remain competing accounts of their emergence and impact. Very broadly, these comprise, on the one hand, perspectives informed by critical political economy, which suggest new modes of urban governance reacting to the dictates of global capital and, on the other hand, approaches more preoccupied with the political contexts of partnership formation. It is the latter body of research that has generated most of the recent work on collaborative policy-making and implementation for urban revitalisation. Here a further distinction is useful between urban coalition theories, centred on alliances of public and private sector actors fixated with boosting local economic growth, and network governance approaches, explaining partnership working in terms of local urban institutional settings and political cultures (see the surveys by Harding, 2005 and Stewart, 2005) .
This theoretical division mirrors in large part a constitutional-level contrast between urban governance in the US and the UK, though a sizeable transatlantic dialogue has also taken place. The influential American scholarship on urban coalitions, from work on individual cities (Mollenkopf, 1992; Stone, 1989) to comparative research (Elkin, 1987; Sanitch and Kantor, 2002) , has consistently highlighted the context-related ways in which multi-organisational partnerships on urban development are constrained, or enabled, by capital investment conditions, intergovernmental support and local political circumstances. British studies on network governance have viewed urban regeneration partnerships as breaking away from state-determined policymaking, being coordinated by relationships of trust (Harding, 1998; Stoker, 1998) : despite key differences with urban coalition theory, this research shares a sensitivity to place-specific influences on partnership working.
However, criticism has been levelled at both urban coalition and network governance approaches for failing to acknowledge the distinctiveness of multi-organisational partnerships as an instrument of urban governance. Partnerships, it is claimed, are neither a direct manifestation of local political bargaining nor simply self-governing networks cut loose from government structures (Davies, 2002: Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998) . I share these concerns, which have also been expressed by public administration scholars disquieted that the theory of multi-organisation working has lagged behind the practice (Sproule-Jones, 2000) . What are the structures and Chinatown -a designated historic district -can trace its origins to this time, with a majority Chinese-speaking community also now in adjoining Strathcona. Many other immigrant groups who first settled in the neighbourhood eventually moved on or, in the case of the Japanese community in Oppenheimer during the Second World War, were forcibly displaced. But the area remains ethnically diverse. In line with Vancouver as a whole, about half the population of the Downtown Eastside is comprised of 'visible minorities', though there is a higher proportion of aboriginal people living in the neighbourhood -notably in Victory Square and Thornton Park, where they make up just under a quarter of the population.
Map 1: Downtown Eastside Communities, Vancouver
The Downtown Eastside has historically contained a large low-income population but, alongside port-related distribution and processing industries, supported a healthy retail and entertainment sector until the 1970s. Since that time, though, deindustrialisation and disinvestment has undermined its economic viability, in marked contrast to the rest of downtown Vancouver. It is significant that, just as the substantial flow of Asian investment into the city in the 1980s and 1990s largely bypassed the Downtown Eastside, the numerous Chinese business immigrants entering Vancouver during that period chose overwhelmingly not to settle in Chinatown (Olds, 2001, pages 99 -140) .
Moreover, the suburbanisation of shopping and creation of larger malls in Illicit drug deaths also peaked in the late 1990s for the Downtown Eastside, as the arrival of crack cocaine accentuated addiction rates in groups already afflicted by high heroin use. For example, at this time aboriginal residents in the neighbourhood were ten times more likely to die from drug-induced deaths than the city average (Vancouver Agreement Secretariat, 2004a, pages 58 -63) . Compounding these problems, in 1994 the provincial government had slashed residential mental health care in Greater Vancouver, and many of the predominantly middle-aged patients migrated to the low-cost single-room occupancy (SRO) hotels in the Downtown Eastside: at the end of the decade, mental diseases or disorders in the 45-54 age group for the neighbourhood were 3.6 times that of Vancouver (Vancouver Agreement Secretariat, 2004a, page 71).
Often of poor quality, SROs constitute half the low-income housing in the Downtown Eastside (5183 units in 2002) , and their residents generally suffer poor health and high rates of hospitalisation. Homelessness is also an issue: of the hundreds regularly sleeping rough in the neighbourhood, two-thirds are aboriginal (BC Housing, 2000; Vancouver Agreement Secretariat, 2004a, page 47) . Since 1998 it has been the priority of the city planners to retain provision of affordable housing in the neighbourhood, while at the same time encouraging limited market-led gentrification.
Already well underway in Strathcona, residential gentrification is being induced by the area's cheap land and central location (Blomley, 2004, pages 32 -36; Punter, 2003, pages 280 -283) . However, as evident from the long-running arguments over the redevelopment of the Hastings Street site of former department store Woodward's, city planners have found it difficult to meet their 'revitalisation without displacement' ambition in the Downtown Eastside -that is, reconciling community stability and private investment interests.
In the late 1990s the popular construction of the Downtown Eastside as a crisis zone threw into relief years of enduring policy failure and political neglect. Within the city council, efforts were already underway to integrate service delivery at the neighbourhood level throughout Vancouver. Downtown Eastside planners argued that such policy coordination between city departments would be inadequate for this Keen to institutionalise the fresh collaboration set in play by the coalition, Mayor
Owen sought a politically sustainable platform to underpin it -one that would strategically bind in both the provincial and federal governments (Owen, 2003) . Each strategic priority will now be outlined.
Revitalisation of the Hastings Corridor
At the heart of the Vancouver Agreement's urban development vision is a two-year 
Resource pooling
Surveying the first flurry of public organisation partnerships in Canada, Kernaghan argued over a decade ago that resource pooling was a common attribute of successful partnerships, as participants reaped significant synergies from the blending of expenditures and expertise (1993, page 74). I deal below (4.4.) with the forecasted benefits arising from collective problem-solving: funding arrangements are clearly pivotal to intergovernmental partnerships, for the routine expectation of politicians sponsoring such agreements is that they will deliver efficiencies and/or combined impacts not possible under existing 'silo-based' governance structures. In western Canada, however, a major obstacle to intergovernmental working on urban development has been the concern of city leaders that the convention of equal cost sharing among federal, provincial and municipal governments imposes an unfairand unsustainable -burden on city finances. The Vancouver Agreement has been presented as a model for a more flexible financing of intergovernmental partnerships, where the parties pool resources according to their fiscal capacity and where, also, private sector money is actively sought (Wong, 2002, page 13) .
Interestingly, prior to the release of the strategic plan, the agreement had no dedicated funding. Monies were made available for approved initiatives from the realignment of existing funding from each level of government. In interviews, participants in the process stated that this was actually an advantage for early collaborative working, as it freed parties from having to haggle over projects dependent on dedicated funding.
The Vancouver Agreement was described as a "political lens" for integrating expenditures already within the remit of the partners -broadly, the community development and health-based work of the provincial government, alongside federal interventions focused on economic revitalisation and criminal justice issues. As already noted, the City of Vancouver was able to make use of existing integrated service delivery structures to channel its expenditures in the Downtown Eastside (e.g. 
Leadership
Almost all the key informants opined that leadership was a necessary condition for advancing intergovernmental collaboration on the agreement, although there were notable differences in emphasis over the political and administrative capacities perceived to be in play. According to urban policy and public administration research, leadership becomes particularly important when the governance challenge is horizontal or vertical integration across interdependent organisations: it has to combine strong, purposive action with the effective mobilisation of support from a disparate range of authorities and constituencies (Haus and Heinelt, 2005, pages Canadian urban development agreements have to be signed up to by politicians: they publicly institutionalise a political will shared by the participating governments.
Nevertheless, as recognised by the interviewees, this investment of political capital can only be cashed out if it energises and, if necessary, alters the operational practices of the relevant bureaucracies. It was mentioned by federal and provincial participants that horizontal management is nowhere mandated in the responsibilities, performance pay and professional standards of public sector officials: the Vancouver Agreement sanctioned what one respondent described as "the permission to take risks when most of us are risk-averse". Significantly, there was a perception that deputy ministers failed to relay effectively to their ministries the administrative challenges issued by their political superiors; but that the agreement was fortunate enough to have administrative champions within the senior bureaucracy -notably, the assistant deputy ministers of participating federal and provincial agencies, the chief executive officer of Vancouver Coastal Health and the chief of the Vancouver Police Department. Once again, the city set the operational agenda for cooperative planning through its existing structures for integrated service delivery, aided by, as one informant stressed, the simple fact that its staff were "already present on the ground" in the Downtown Eastside.
Community involvement
In the UK, where urban regeneration partnerships are well-established, studies have noted the limited scope of much community participation, despite government rhetoric extolling local empowerment. Evidence has been marshalled to show that, where community inclusion is meaningful, collaborative processes are more likely to meet the economic and social needs of disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Mayo and Taylor, 2001; Stewart, 2005) input. An inter-departmental core staff team, directed by the city manager's office, ensures that staff from the community development project sit on the Vancouver Agreement management and coordination committees, and this is perceived as an appropriate conduit for relaying the concerns of Downtown Eastside residents.
However, the relationship between the two initiatives has not been clearly defined, with the city still to deliver on its plan to institutionalise local participation by means of a community roundtable (Coyne, 2003, pages 32 -33; Macleod Institute, 2003, pages 15 -16 ).
An unresolved tension accompanies the community capacity-building aspirations of 
Mutual learning
A core rationale for collaborative, multi-organisational partnerships is that they foster the cognitive capacity of the parties to address complex problems. For intergovernmental partnerships in particular, where participants typically come from sectoral, hierarchical modes of working, cooperation offers the potential for mutual learning; that is, collective understanding gained from exposure to new information and perspectives. An influential thesis from the scholarship on partnerships involving public organisations is that successful collaboration entails at least an underlying reliance on informal, trust-based relationships: these social networks are the wellspring of shared learning for effective horizontal management (Kernaghan, 1993; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Sproule-Jones, 2000) .
In interviews, participants in the Vancouver Agreement from each tier of government identified collaborative learning as a key dynamic and outcome of the process. The task teams were seen as the loci of this learning, in part by releasing staff time, through efficiency savings, for problem-based deliberations; although more emphasis was given to what was termed "knowledge spillover" -cognitive or informational gains generated by closer engagement with client groups and interaction with new sources of expertise. Given the overlapping memberships and mandates of the task teams, these spillovers were perceived to take place across as well as within teams. In accounting for the knowledge spillovers of their tripartite working, federal representatives made reference to the concept of learning organisations, as interpreted for public service management in Canada by Lawrence (1998) . Imported from organisation theory, its stress on deliberative communication and team-based problem-solving was described as informing the lean, flattened structure of the Vancouver Agreement. However, most informants viewed agreement-induced collaborative learning simply as a result of good working relationships between receptive individuals. By facilitating flexible, cross-agency cooperation, the Vancouver Agreement was credited with promoting the transmission of skills and information, which both rendered the process more effective, and also fed back into the participating public sector organisations. Continuity of personnel was seen as indispensable to mutual learning: indeed, a high turnover of federal and provincial staff during the first few years of the agreement was judged to have slowed down progress in intergovernmental collaboration.
Horizontal accountability
As highlighted by Stewart (2005) , the governance of multi-sectoral working presents novel questions regarding accountability: "joint action and co-funding cloud the responsibilities and obligations of participant organisations in partnership and traditional expressions of accountability become unclear" (page 162). When, as with the Vancouver Agreement, collaborative decision-making is restricted to governmental partners, the challenge is to isolate the distinctive answerability for horizontal programmes over and above hierarchical (vertical) chains of responsibility already in place for the participating departments or ministries. Disaggregating horizontal from vertical accountability is by no means easy, but public administration scholars see formal structures for monitoring and reporting programme outcomes as critical to the credibility of any claims to success by collaborative partnerships (Kernaghan, 1993, page 75; Sproule-Jones, 2000, pages 103 -105) . 
